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In the present commentary, we first examine the three target articles included in the Asian Journal of Social
Psychology special issue on cultural neuroscience. We spell out the contributions that the articles have offered to
the field. We extend this examination with our own theoretical model of neuro-culture interaction, which
proposes that brain connectivity changes as a function of each person’s active, repeated engagement in culture’s
scripted behavioural patterns (i.e. practices). We then locate the current endeavour of cultural neuroscience
within a broader framework, detailing empirical, theoretical, and meta-theoretical reasons why the approach of
cultural neuroscience is important to both socio-behavioural and biological sciences. It is concluded that the
scholarship demonstrated in the target articles will be an important collective asset for all of us who aspire to
understand the human mind as fundamentally biocultural and to study it as such.
Key words: brain, cultural neuroscience, culture, epigenesis, neuroplasticity.
Introduction
How will culture influence the brain and, conversely, how
will the brain be part of a sociocultural dynamic that con-
stitutes the daily social reality? Is the field ready to tackle
these big questions that encompass what appears to be the
most micro of micro-processes in social life (the brain) and
what would seem to be the most macro of macro-processes
(culture)? Or, if not, is it really wise to even give it a shot?
One can further ask if there is anything new in the allegedly
new field of cultural neuroscience. Isn’t it just old wine in
a new, fashionable bottle – just yet another fad that will go
away sooner or later? Most of all, one could object to the
field on the ground that cultural neuroscience is intolerably
reductionistic: How can dynamic sociocultural processes
be explained by neurons?
These are some of the questions sceptics might immedi-
ately ask on the field of cultural neuroscience that has just
begun to emerge over the last few years (Chiao & Ambady,
2007; Han & Northoff, 2008; Kitayama & Park, in press;
Kitayama & Uskul, 2010). These questions would seem
reasonable and, at least to some extent, they are well justi-
fied. If, for example, cultural neuroscience should claim to
explain the sociocultural solely in terms of the brain, the
field would surely be guilty of reductionism.
In view of these and probably numerous other questions
on cultural neuroscience, the three target articles included
in the Asian Journal of Social Psychology’s special issue on
cultural neuroscience are especially welcome. They can
serve both as introductory reviews to the field and as an
excellent source for research ideas. And, most of all, they
offer much needed reassurance that there is something to
‘it’, thereby inviting many promising young scholars both
in Asia and elsewhere to the field. In fact, these articles
make it very clear that the sceptics would at least have to
carefully examine what the field has offered so far and to
listen to what its advocates have argued. Once the future of
this field is seen from its advocates’ point of view, very
different scenery may begin to emerge – this scenery is that
of a frontier that is just waiting to be discovered and
exploited to yield a major advancement in the sciences of
both culture and brain.
The three articles are thus quite timely. Each of them is a
concise and well-written treatise that must be read carefully
by all students of this new field. Furthermore, the scholar-
ship demonstrated here is first rate. The thesis in each case
is thought-provoking and intellectually highly stimulating.
The three articles, with eight cutting-edge scholars together
as a group, have taken stock of previous theories and find-
ings in both cultural and cross-cultural psychology and
cognitive and social neuroscience. They then have gone a
big step further by envisioning the future of the project of
both using neuroscience as yet another set of tools to inves-
tigate cultural processes and, conversely, using culture as a
context in which to further examine neuropsychological
processes of the human mind.
Main points revisited
Zhou and Cacioppo
The piece by Zhou and Cacioppo (2010) is perhaps the
most general and encompassing of the three target articles,
insofar as their goal is to situate the emerging field of
cultural neuroscience within a multi-level framework that
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connects the biological to the social and vice versa. The
authors argue that current behavioural paradigms of cul-
tural and social psychology need to be integrated with
methods and approaches of neuroscience. They maintain
that examining the mutual relationship between sociocul-
tural and neurobiological processes is essential to under-
standing the most fundamental aspects of human nature. In
supporting this argument, Zhou and Cacioppo highlight
how functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
methodology can be integrated with various cultural psy-
chological approaches to yield fruitful and potentially
groundbreaking research. They emphasize that social neu-
roscience techniques have the ability to differentiate
between underlying neural processes and address cultural
differences in mental processes. Of importance, some of the
mental processes that can be studied with functional MRI
(fMRI) and other neuroscience measures might not neces-
sarily result in any behavioural differences and, thus, could
be beyond scientific investigation without the current
methods of neuroscience.
Zhou and Cacioppo (2010) finish with a list of issues
which future researchers should be wary of when using
fMRI to examine culture and the brain. While many of
these caveats simply highlight the current limitations of
fMRI technology which apply to any fMRI researcher,
some are of special significance for cultural neuroscience.
We will return to some of these issues later in the present
paper.
Ames and Fiske
Ames and Fiske (2010) take a somewhat different
approach. Their aim is to provide a panoramic view of the
current field of cultural neuroscience. They start out by
noting how counter-intuitive it may initially appear that the
combination of two seemingly incompatible disciplines –
cultural psychology and neuroscience – can result in sig-
nificant mutual benefit to both. They provide a compelling
argument for not only the necessity of combining the two
approaches, but also for the need to look across multiple
domains to examine the biological underpinnings of
culture. As they note, the human brain is ‘biologically pre-
pared to acquire culture: The ability to coordinate thoughts
and behaviours within social groups has aided primate and
hominid survival’ (p. 72).
Ames and Fiske (2010) have done an admirable job to
bring together, and provide evidence for, cultural differ-
ences in brain functioning across a diverse range of psy-
chological phenomena. Their review extends from basic
cognitive processes (e.g. object processing, colour and taste
perception) to complex social psychological processes (e.g.
mental representations of the self and others, trait/belief
inference). For example, they discuss a study by Gutchess,
Welsh, Boduroglu, and Park (2006) which suggests that
cultural differences in object processing are related to
increases in activation in areas of the brain associated with
object processing among Westerners, rather than increases
in activation in areas of the brain associated with back-
ground processing among Easterners. Ames and Fiske
present this as an example of how cultural neuroscience
could empirically test two competing hypotheses that
suggest the same behavioural predictions. They conclude
with suggestions for areas that may yield fruitful cultural
neuroscience research in the near future.
Ng, Han, Mao, and Lai
Unlike the first two articles, the third and final article from
this AJSP special issue is an empirical study. Obviously
narrower in scope than either of the earlier two, the article
by Ng, Han, Mao, and Lai (2010) nonetheless offers some-
thing that is just as fundamental in its own way. This paper
is a prime example demonstrating many of the ideas dis-
cussed in the two other papers in this issue. Specifically,
they present empirical work which demonstrates how a
sociocultural framework can be used with fMRI to show
real cultural differences in neural activity. They conceptu-
ally replicate the findings of Zhu, Zhang, Fan, and Han
(2007), showing that whereas neural representations of the
self and others (even significant others) are differentiated in
the Western brain, the neural structure of the self in Chinese
is more closely connected with others, as indicated by
activity in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC).
Importantly, Ng et al. (2010) extend the Zhu et al. (2007)
findings in two significant ways. First, they show that the
strong overlap between self and significant others extends
beyond significant others with whom one identifies (i.e.
mother), to others who play an important role in one’s life,
but with whom they do not identify (non-identified person
or NIP). More significantly, they use a within-subjects
design, including only bicultural participants from Hong
Kong who rate high in both Chinese and Western self-
identity, which rules out confounding variables such as
language or genetics, and shows that people with strong
bicultural identities have both independent and interdepen-
dent neural representations of the self, which can be differ-
entially activated depending on the cultural context.
Cultural neuroscience as an integrated
approach to human psychology
Admirable and extremely useful in their own ways,
however, the three articles left out some issues that must be
brought back to the foreground and fully discussed for their
implications. In our opinion, none of the three papers offers
an adequate conceptualization of what culture is. Culture is
a multifaceted concept, which encompasses attitudes,
beliefs, and other social cognitions, as well as social repre-
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sentations and socially shared ideas. Moreover, daily
scripted routines called practices or cultural tasks, as well
as social institutions and other systems of social interaction,
are also of importance (Kitayama, Conway, Pietromonaco,
& Park, 2010). It is not at all clear which aspects of culture
may be significant in cultural neuroscience and why.
Another issue stems from the fact that developmental
perspectives are missing in all three articles. It is surely
interesting to show that cultures are different. It is even
more interesting to show that this difference can be
observed in brain responses. Yet, if one is to hope to under-
stand the nature of cultural influence, it is inevitable, at
some point, to start asking much more difficult questions of
why and how such differences have come about over time.
These questions must be formulated at the levels of evolu-
tion, history, and individual development. We are well
aware that some may argue that it is a bit too much and,
thus, a bit unfair to raise these ‘big questions’. Yet, even
though the field is not quite ready to tackle them, it is well
advised to start thinking about and analyzing them. This
theoretical effort may have some positive ramifications
even though such big questions might prove to be too dif-
ficult to handle at the present moment.
What we wish to add to the already impressive collection
of papers is to address these questions. We will start by
providing a general theoretical framework of our own in
which to locate major points made by each target article and
then draw some additional implications from it. We will
then discuss some new directions for the new field of cul-
tural neuroscience.
Neuro-culture interaction model
Our theoretical framework, called the neuro-culture inter-
action model (Kitayama & Park, 2010; Kitayama & Uskul,
2010), is presented in Figure 1. The model draws on a
time-honoured idea that culture constitutes an external
environment by providing a number of scripted behavioural
routines called practices (see e.g. Shweder, 1990). For
example, contemporary American society offers a number
of practices, such as show-and-tell and publish-or-perish,
that are tied closely to values of independence such as
self-expression and personal achievement. The practices
are historically produced as a function of a variety of
macro-level factors such as ecology, subsistence systems,
population density, residential mobility, social and political
systems and institutions (Box 1 of Fig. 1). They are further
weaved into collectively shared ideologies such as indi-
vidualism, collectivism, honour, and nationalism, among
others. Scripted behavioural routines or practices which a
cultural group has accumulated across generations consti-
tute the reservoir of the culture’s wisdom and practical
knowledge about how to survive, what is good and beauti-
ful, and how good and beautiful things can be achieved or
attained (Box 2 of Fig. 1).
One key idea underlying this model is that cultural
wisdom as represented in the pool of practices is acquired
and accumulated in the brain as new members of the culture
begin engaging in some of the practices, insofar as brain
connectivity is likely to change as a function of active,
wilful engagement in scripted behavioural routines
(Boxes 3 and 4 of Fig. 1). The perspective of the
neuro-culture interaction model is thus fundamentally
developmental.
For example, Draganski et al. (2004) found that training
in juggling leads to structural changes in brain areas asso-
ciated with the processing and storage of complex visual
motion. This study showed that repeated engagement in a
task over a relatively short period of time (3 months in this
study) can lead, not only to functional changes in cortical
activity, but also to anatomical changes in cortical structure.
To the extent that the task is therefore more or less promi-
nent in a given culture, we may expect that repeated
engagement in the task should lead to cultural differences
in functional connectivity and, perhaps, in the physical
structure of the brain as well. Now, basically the same point
has been repeatedly made in respect to the abacas
(Hanakawa, Honda, Okada, Fukuyama, & Shibasaki,
2003), musical instruments (Muente, Nager, Beiss,
Schroeder, & Altenmueller, 2003), and cab driving
Figure 1 Neuro-culture interaction
model. Adopted from Kitayama and
Uskul (2010) with modifications.
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(Maguire et al., 2000) among others. Very much likewise,
once people engage in their own culture and start acting in
accordance with the culture’s scripted patterns for action,
their brain changes accordingly.
One important point to keep in mind is that if engage-
ment in cultural practices is to change a person’s brain,
the engagement may have to be wilful, voluntary, and
active. When individuals conduct a certain behaviour will-
ingly and voluntarily, they will represent their own goal as
something they really want to achieve, attend to a variety
of relevant stimuli in the environment with curiosity, seek
out relevant stimuli vis-à-vis the personal goal while
avoiding or ignoring some others, and coordinate their
behaviour accordingly. Most importantly, achieving the
personal goal is likely to produce an internal reward – a
positive hedonic state – that reinforces the entire sequence
of curiosity, attention, and action coordination. In con-
trast, when they regulate their behaviour vis-à-vis an
externally imposed normative goal, they may not show as
much curiosity in the environment. Moreover, they may
do what they have to do while referring to some obviously
relevant environmental stimuli with minimum effort. Most
of all, internal rewards are much less likely to be
involved. It is our hypothesis, then, that brain circuitry is
more likely to be stimulated, new neurons generated and
unnecessary ones pruned when the behaviour is regulated
in reference to one’s personal goal and thus is a source of
internal reward, but that the plastic brain change is
increasingly less likely when the behaviour is situationally
controlled.
This point has been clearly demonstrated in animal
studies, which indicate that repeated actions can have sub-
stantial impacts on the production of new neurons and
subsequent modification of brain connectivity only if the
actions are voluntary. van Praag, Kempermann, and Gage
(1999) found that voluntary engagement in physical activ-
ity resulted in significant increases in the production of
neurons in the mouse hippocampus. Importantly, forced
engagement in physical activity did not result in any
increases in hippocampal neurogenesis.
It is reasonable to assume that individuals are likely to
engage in their culture in an active, voluntary, and persis-
tent fashion if they identify with the culture and their self-
concept and values are congruous with the values
sanctioned by their culture. For example, Western cultures
place a strong emphasis on independent or individualistic
values such as self-promotion, self-uniqueness, and per-
sonal achievement. Yet, individuals may vary considerably
in the degree to which they endorse these foundational
values of culture (Schwartz, 1992). The more committed
they are to these values the more likely it would be for them
to actively, repeatedly, and voluntarily engage in the cul-
ture’s practices, with correspondingly larger consequent
changes in their brain connectivity.
Once changed through engagement in cultural practices,
the brain may be expected to influence subsequent behav-
iours, both covert (e.g. attention and reasoning) and overt
(e.g. social behaviour). However, any behaviour is multiply
determined and regulated and the culturally modified brain
connectivity is only one of many factors that can influence
any given behaviour. Among others, if any given behaviour
is inconsistent with situational norms, it will be interrupted
or inhibited. It is likely, then, that the culturally modified
brain connectivity will foster the relevant culturally scripted
behaviour only when the behaviour is normatively sanc-
tioned and thus strongly called for in a given social situa-
tion (Box 5 of Fig. 1).
Although this point might seem obvious given a number
of studies in social psychology demonstrating the power of
social situation in influencing social behaviour (Ross &
Nisbett, 1991), its implications can be far-reaching. In par-
ticular, Kitayama and Uskul (2010) have argued that spon-
taneous and seamless behaviours that are normatively
sanctioned culturally and strongly called for by a given
situation can affirm the person as a good cultural member in
the eyes of both the self and others who witness the behav-
iours (Box 6 of Fig. 1). The recognition of the self as a good
cultural member will create and reinforce the person’s cul-
tural identity, consolidating his or her commitment to the
values of the culture. At the same time, the comparable
recognition by others will enhance the self’s reputations in
the cultural community as a good and committed cultural
member, thereby improving and securing the stature of the
self within the community. And, in the long run, this will
have other positive consequences, increasing the likelihood
of the person succeeding socially, economically and, even-
tually, reproductively (Kitayama & Park, 2010; Kitayama
& Uskul, 2010) (Box 7 of Fig. 1).
Some implications of the neuro-culture
interaction model
The neuro-culture interaction model can be used as a heu-
ristic in making some suggestions on possible forms of
culture–brain interaction. We believe that some of the
insights suggested by the three target articles are quite
congruous with such implications of the neuro-culture
interaction model. We found three noteworthy points.
Connectivity is crucial. First, the neuro-culture interaction
model suggests that brain connectivity should change as a
result of persistent and willing engagement in some specific
set of cultural practices. It is connectivity, rather than the
absolute level of activation of any given brain regions per
se, that is influenced by culture. Quite consistent with this
analysis, Zhou and Cacioppo (2010) discuss the importance
of examining the connectivity between different brain
regions, rather than examining the brain regions in isola-
Future of cultural neuroscience 95
© 2010 The Authors
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association
tion. While an analysis regarding connectivity certainly
leads to predictions that cultural differences would exist in
the relative strength of neural activity among neurons
within a given brain region, it also would predict that cul-
tural differences should exist in the relative strength of
activity among neurons in different brain regions. There-
fore, single region analyses ignore a large set of potential
cultural differences. While the research discussed in this
issue primarily focuses on activity within regions of the
brain, the overwhelming evidence for within-region cul-
tural differences would lead one to predict that there should
also be a bounty of cultural differences in the connectivity
between brain regions.
Predicting brain responses with self-belief measures of
values, self, and identity. Following the logic of the neuro-
culture interaction model, one might suggest that it is
not culture in the sense of group membership per se, but
rather culture in the sense of one’s subjective commitment
to the culture’s foundational values and associated practices
that produce relatively enduring brain changes. This means,
for example, that if Sam is committed to his own cultural
group’s foundational values of independence, he is likely to
actively, willingly, and repeatedly participate in the cul-
ture’s practices that are linked to independence. This
should, in turn, leave relatively enduring brain traces that
produce a variety of cognitive, emotional, and motivational
biases that are congruous with the relevant practices. One
striking implication of this analysis is that brain responses
are likely to be predicted by each person’s values, self-
concepts, and other attitudes that predispose the person to
engage in the pertinent cultural practices. In fact, one
finding that is hidden behind some of the studies reviewed
by Ames and Fiske (2010) is that brain measures indicative
of independence (or interdependence) are often reliably
predicted by self-reported levels of independent (or inter-
dependent) social orientation as assessed by conventional
questionnaire scales (Kitayama & Uskul, 2010). This
emerging evidence might not surprise anyone, except those,
like us, who have conducted research in the area of culture
over years. The fact is that the corresponding correlations
are typically very hard to observe with behavioural
measures as a dependent variable (e.g. Kitayama, Park,
Servincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009).
The finding that self-belief measures of cultural values
are far more likely to predict neural, rather than behav-
ioural, responses may seem quite puzzling at first glance
because it is unlikely to be an artifact of either low reliabil-
ity of the behavioural measures (because the test–retest
reliability of these measures are often reasonably high) or
the inflated likelihood of Type-I errors that is allegedly
common in imaging research (Vul, Harris, Winkielman, &
Pashler, 2009, because this arguably is not the case with
specific event-related potential [ERP] measures) (see
Kitayama & Uskul, 2010). The finding, however, may
begin to make sense once some aspects of the neuro-culture
interaction model are taken seriously. The model predicts
that neuroplasticity should only arise from willing and
repeated engagement in a particular culture’s practices.
Accordingly, level of cultural identity should be an impor-
tant factor in predicting this engagement. Hence, high cul-
tural self-identity should lead to greater willingness to
voluntarily and continuously participate in a culture, and
result in the subsequent, long-term changes in neural con-
nections. However, engagement in practices of a culture
one does not identify with may lead to certain behavioural
tendencies that are instigated by situational norms, but may
not lead to any long-term changes in neural activity
because, in such cases, the engagement is more likely to be
seen as forced or driven by external factors. These behav-
iours may then not be related either to the self-identity or to
culturally shaped brain connectivity.
Significance of systematic participant sampling. While
providing important information on culture–brain interac-
tion, the systematic individual difference predicted by the
degree of engagement in culture raises a serious concern in
sampling. This is especially true, as Zhou and Cacioppo
(2010) pointed out, because the standard for sample size in
neuroscience research is significantly smaller than what is
typically used in cultural psychology research. With
smaller sample size comes larger sampling error and, as a
result, there is a greater risk that the sample is not repre-
sentative of the culture being studied. Additionally, as most
neuroscience research has used Western populations, and
neuroscience research is relatively newer to Eastern coun-
tries, there could be some sampling biases related to per-
ceptions of risk involved in neuroscience research,
especially in studies that use methodology that non-
Western populations may be less familiar with, such as
fMRI.
One useful measure of precaution might be to carry out a
large-scale survey study first and measure potential partici-
pants’ values, self-concepts, and identities and use this
information in participant recruitment. For example, par-
ticipants may be recruited equally from the entire range of
distribution of, say, independence or interdependence.
Alternatively, they may be recruited from each of the two
extremes of the distribution. In either case, this systematic
sampling method pre-empts biased sampling that can seri-
ously distort the data especially when the N is quite small.
In this regard, we found it quite commendable that Ng
et al. (2010) used an explicit criterion to select their experi-
mental participants. Previous research suggests that for par-
ticipants low in cultural identity or whose bicultural
identities are in conflict, cultural cues may elicit patterns of
behaviour opposite to those espoused by the culture being
cued (Mok & Morris, 2009). Therefore, it is quite possible
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that participants low in cultural identity would not show the
same results as those in the Ng et al. study when primed
with a culture they had low self-identity for. Thus, their
results may specifically hinge on their subject recruitment
and, without their systematic subject selection, these results
may not be interpretable.
Three reasons why we need
cultural neuroscience
So far, we have reviewed the three target articles and in
doing so we have also introduced our own theoretical
model for the culture–brain interaction. It is clear that our
own thinking resonates well with the three target articles in
several key points. Furthermore, both the theory and the
empirical data of cultural neuroscience now seem strong
enough to counter many of the criticisms and questions
sceptics might level against this new endeavour.
Here, then, we would like to go back to the questions
we attributed to sceptics at the beginning of this commen-
tary. We noted that the questions are real and, to some
extent, very well justified. In fact, under some different
guises, they have often been heard argued by researchers
of some neighbouring disciplines. After having examined
the three target articles in some detail and presented our
own theoretical approach, we wish to address these ques-
tions head on. Fortified with ideas and data taken stock so
far in this commentary, this effort may enable us to assess
the present state of cultural neuroscience from an over-
arching perspective and then to envision future directions
for the field.
As shall be made clear, despite all the criticisms that can
be levelled against cultural neuroscience, we believe that
cultural neuroscience has substantive potential to make
important contributions to both social and behavioural sci-
ences and biological sciences. There are three important
reasons for this assessment. These reasons focus, respec-
tively, on empirical, theoretical, and meta-theoretical con-
siderations for cultural neuroscience.
Empirical reason: Neuroscience measures
provide information that is unique and
indispensable for theory building
We started out our own cultural neuroscience project just a
few years ago. Back then, our primary motivation was
rather simple and, one could say, rather naïve: We just
wanted to see how deep culture might go ‘under the skin’.
To address this question, it is obviously important to use
measures that tap processes within the skull in more or less
direct fashion. From this fact alone, neuroscience measures
such as fMRI and ERP can provide important information
about how culture might get into the brain in ways that are
simply impossible to gauge with behavioural measures (e.g.
self-report, judgment, memory, response time, perfor-
mance) alone.
As shown in a review by Ames and Fiske (2010), the
progress of empirical work in cultural neuroscience in the
last few years is remarkable. It is now very clear that our
original question has received an answer and, yes, culture
does indeed go under the skin. More importantly, however,
the progress that occurred in the interim has shown abun-
dantly the ability of the neuroscience measures to address
important theoretical questions as well.
To illustrate, consider the theory of cognitive dissonance
– arguably the most important theory in social psychology
during the last century. The original theory claimed that
attitude-inconsistent behaviour causes a negative arousal,
called dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Because dissonance is
aversive, people are motivated to reduce it by revising their
attitude to restore the state of consonance. Researchers have
worked very hard to demonstrate the actuality of the nega-
tive arousal as a guiding force of the observed attitude
change (Cooper, Zanna, & Taves, 1978). As it turned out,
this effort was very difficult, if not utterly impossible, with
behavioural measures alone. Neuroscience measures would
enable us to fill the gap. We now know that certain brain
areas that are linked to conflict monitoring (ACC) and
negative somatic arousal (anterior insula) are strongly acti-
vated when people behave in an attitude-incongruous
fashion and, moreover, these activations do predict subse-
quent attitude change (van Veen, Krug, Schooler, & Carter,
2009). At least among Caucasian Americans, the negatively
arousing state called dissonance is real and functionally
linked to attitude change. This finding must be expanded
cross-culturally insofar as the conditions in which disso-
nance occurs are likely to vary considerably across cultures
depending on the nature of the self that is sanctioned in a
given culture (Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004).
In addition to their ability to enable us to have direct
access to underlying processes (e.g. dissonance in the
above example), neuroscience measures can be useful in
some other ways as well. In particular, online measurement
of electrical activity on the scalp as participants carry out
certain cognitive tasks (called ERP) enables us to observe
processes more directly as they occur over time. We now
know, for example, that when people hear someone speak a
word in a vocal tone that is inconsistent with the meaning of
the word, the inconsistency is detected quite rapidly, as
early as 300–400 ms post stimulus (Ishii, Reyes, &
Kitayama, 2003). Evidence, in fact, is very strong that the
ability to detect inconsistent word meaning vis-à-vis its
background vocal tone is substantially higher for females
than for males when assessed with the ERP measure (Ishii,
Kobayashi, & Kitayama, 2010; Schirmer & Kotz, 2003).
Surprisingly, however, the gender difference rarely shows
up when the seemingly identical phenomenon is tested with
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behavioural measures such as response time and judgment
accuracy (Ishii et al., 2003). In this case, it is quite clear that
the brain measure is tapping processes that are totally
missed by the behavioural measures. Some other similar
examples are discussed in the Zhou and Cacioppo (2010)
article.
Remember our earlier discussion on the ability of self-
belief measures of, say, independence and interdependence
to predict brain measures of independence or interdepen-
dence, but not their behavioural counterparts. Kitayama and
Uskul (2010) used this observation as evidence for an
aspect of the neuro-culture interaction model. That is, the
model proposes that self-beliefs predict how persistently
and earnestly one engages in pertinent cultural practices,
which, in turn, predict corresponding changes in brain con-
nectivity. However, behavioural habits can be influenced by
numerous other factors including, among others, situational
norms. Aside from the eventual validity of this theoretical
analysis, it is quite obvious that the neuroscience measures
are again tapping processes (i.e. accumulation and repre-
sentation of cultural information in the brain) that the tra-
ditional behavioural measures find hard to handle.
Theoretical reason: Culture and the brain
make each other up
Ames and Fiske (2010) started out their target article by
pointing out the seemingly contradictory nature of the
effort to combine culture with the brain. Through their
meticulous review of emerging cultural neuroscience evi-
dence, the authors successfully showed that this effort is
necessary and potentially successful. We are in full agree-
ment with them.
For some time, it has been argued that the mammalian
brain, in general, and the human brain, in particular, are
fundamentally social (Dunbar, 2007) – a point echoed by
Zhou and Cacioppo (2010). In fact, the human brain by
design needs a massive amount of external input for it to be
fully functional (Stiles, 2008). It goes without saying, then,
that the brain requires culture. With increasing research
effort on neuroplasticity in recent years, this point will, in
all likelihood, be demonstrated even more powerfully in the
near future. Simple as it may be, the point deserves empha-
sis as it illustrates the urgent need for the mainstream neu-
roscience research to incorporate culture into its purview.
Conversely, cultural psychology needs neuroscience as
well, not just because neuroscience measures provide non-
redundant information (as shown above), but also, more
crucially, because the brain is an indispensable element for
culture to work. Within the framework presented by the
neuro-culture interaction model, culture is composed of
scripted routines called cultural practices. These practices
are associated with a variety of ideas and beliefs. And most
importantly, these practices represent a crucial medium by
which the brain is modified. People who are committed to
the values and worldviews of the culture are likely to carry
out the culture’s practices persistently and earnestly, with
resulting changes in brain connectivity. Culture is enlivened
and, thus, can become a powerful determinant of human
mentalities because of its ability to engage the brain as its
part. In short, it is not too far-fetched to say, following Rick
Shweder’s (1990) proclamation two decades ago that
culture and the brain, in a very literal sense, make each
other up.
If framed as a constituent element of culture, the brain
can no longer be seen as a sole engine that causes uni-
directional influences on all other processes. Whereas the
brain is a site that accumulates and embodies information
stemming from dynamic sociocultural patterns, culture is a
rich source of symbolic and behavioural resources that
make it possible for the brain to grow and become fully
functional. Far from reductionistic, cultural neuroscience,
if properly understood and practiced, would be the study of
a comprehensive system of human biological adaptation
that encompasses both collective-level processes of eco-
social systems (including ‘culture’ narrowly defined) and
neuro-physiological processes of the brain.
Meta-theoretical reason: Integrating nature
and nurture
The first two reasons we cited pertain to both empirical
considerations (empirical reason) and theoretical consider-
ations (theoretical reason) that suggest the proposed inte-
gration between cultural psychology and neuroscience will
be highly fruitful and productive. These considerations,
however, may be expanded and reinforced with some addi-
tional considerations that are more meta-theoretical. They
pertain to human evolution and genetic and epigenetic pro-
cesses that are likely to be closely tied to both brain and
culture. We call these considerations meta-theoretical only
because little or no published research exists today that
investigates these issues up-front. This will change soon in
all likelihood (see Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010, for a pioneer-
ing effort). When that happens, cultural neuroscience will
have bridged natural sciences and social sciences, thereby
overcoming the unfortunate division of labour between the
two types of sciences.
One important event that is likely to have precipitating
impacts has already taken place. The National Institute of
Mental Health sponsored a highly cross-disciplinary
by-invitation-only conference on culture, evolution, and the
brain at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
Sciences (CASBS) in Stanford, California, on 26–27
March, 2010. One of us (Kitayama) co-organized the con-
ference with a developmental psychologist (Anne Petersen)
and a primatologist (Stephen Suomi). The three of us liter-
ally witnessed the collaborative spirit and the intellectual
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excitement that permeated the entire conference. In our
assessment, all participants including ourselves strongly
sensed a new field in its making.
So far, cultural research, both behavioural and neural,
has focused on cross-cultural variations in behaviour and
in the brain. The horizon of this endeavour will be imme-
diately expanded once it is realized that human evolution
did not stop when culture was born. Hawks and colleagues
(e.g. Hawks, Wang, Cochran, Harpending, & Moyzis,
2007) have presented a strong case for an exponentially
increasing rate of active genetic selections over the last
10 000 years. These selections can be very minor, and are
likely to account for only a miniscule amount of genetic
variation in humans today. In fact, they are largely con-
fined to what may be called single nucleotide polymor-
phisms (SNPs). Yet, given appropriate external conditions,
a small change can cause large effects. Thus, conse-
quences of a miniscule genetic change on body morpholo-
gies and psychological functions can sometimes be quite
sizable and crucially important in understanding local
forms of adaptation.
The active genetic selections over the last 10 000 years
are made possible by both increasing population size and
high population density, both fostered and reinforced by the
invention of agriculture. SNPs are thus likely to be highly
local and contingent on specific modes of ecological, socio-
cultural, and even linguistic adaptations (Cochran &
Harpending, 2009). Until just a few years ago, it was quite
reasonable to postulate that culture is a matter of learning
and biology is a matter of organismic design. This division
of labour is no longer possible and, in fact, it is likely to
impede progress of the field if rigidly endorsed. Quite lit-
erally, culture can provide a dynamic context for genetic
selection, while, at the same time, genes have the potential
to be an extremely powerful force that motivates certain
forms of culture in lieu of others.
Most excitingly, the CASBS conference highlighted the
fact that recent advancement in epigenetic processes has
provided, in broad outline, how one might begin to
combine the two disparate fields of research, namely, cul-
tural variation in mentality and brain on the one hand and
highly local and relatively recent (less than 10 000 years
old) genetic selections on the other hand. Recent epige-
netic research has demonstrated that gene expressions are
contingent on daily experiences throughout the life span.
At least in some cases, detailed mechanisms have been
worked out through which external environmental inputs
(e.g. trauma early in life) can change the expression of
certain genes, resulting in considerable behavioural differ-
ences (e.g. depression, aggressiveness, or violence) later in
life (Ian, Weaver, Meaney, & Moshe, 2006). Given this
new development, it is now conceivable to envision certain
mechanisms by which recurrent behaviours that are pat-
terned by culture can plausibly trigger a cascade of neuro-
physiological events that eventually cause significant
differences in the expression of certain key genes, which
could, in turn, play important roles in forming relevant
brain-processing pathways. The resulting neural complex
of the brain predisposes the person to act in certain ways,
which, in turn, influences his or her reproductive success,
thereby eventually contributing to the population-level
prevalence of the genes involved.
As in all cases in science, the devil is in the details.
Admittedly, the details have yet to be investigated, let alone
specified. Nevertheless, the foregoing theoretical blueprint
that integrates culture, genes, and the brain was simply not
available until just a few years ago. At a minimum, the
emerging theoretical blueprint will likely influence what
we study and how we study it, thereby having significant
long-term effects on how the field unfolds in the next
decade. We are, therefore, hopeful that the future effort to
expand the current neuroscience in this new direction can
have far-reaching consequences on our very basic under-
standing about human nature. Once achieved, this new
understanding will have overcome the current dichotomy
between the sociocultural and the biological, thereby pre-
senting a truly integrated image of the human as both bio-
logical and cultural. We thus submit that the sociocultural
can provide a very exciting new frontier for neuroscience.
In all likelihood, by exploiting this new frontier, our under-
standing of the sociocultural will also have been radically
transformed.
Conclusions
We started out with a critical examination of the three target
articles included in the AJSP special issue on cultural neu-
roscience. We spelled out the contributions that the articles
have offered to the field. We extended this examination with
our own theoretical model of culture–brain interaction. We
then sought to locate the current endeavour of cultural
neuroscience within a broader framework, detailing three
reasons why the approach of cultural neuroscience is
important to both social and biological sciences.
In our judgment, this commentary will have succeeded if
we can convey our own excitement about the effort to
integrate cultural psychology and neuroscience and, more
importantly, our own sense of mission – a mission to see to
it that cultural neuroscience fulfils its promise. As in all
such efforts, envisioning the future is one thing, and creat-
ing it is quite another. Yet, the vision is essential in influ-
encing what we can eventually craft. The three target
articles are indispensable contributions in this regard. The
admirable depth and scholarship demonstrated here will
surely be an important collective asset for all of us who
aspire to understand the human mind as fundamentally
biocultural and to study it as such.
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